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THE COLONIAL SCHOLAR: DO OUTSIDER AUTHORS
REPLICATE THE CITATION PRACTICES OF THE INSIDERS,
BUT IN REVERSE?
RICHARD DELGADO*
In two previous articles, I analyzed the citation practices of main-
stream scholars writing in the areas of civil rights and equality. In The
Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature,1 I
showed that the major figures who were writing during the heyday of
the Civil Rights Movement marginalized and ignored the writings of
scholars of color to a surprising degree. In a follow-up article written
ten years later, I showed that, although some majority-race scholars
had changed their citation practices, and many of the newer scholars
were avoiding the errors of their predecessors, much of the same pref-
erence for in-group recognition that I noticed earlier held true in
1992.2
One as yet unaddressed question is whether outsider scholars-
crits, feminists, and critical race theorists ("CRTs")-are guilty of the
same pattern of behavior. As I stated on another occasion, "all dis-
course marginalizes, ' ' 3 hence it is a reasonable hypothesis that out-
sider scholars may be evidencing the same preference for the familiar
that characterized their more mainstream counterparts in my two ear-
lier studies. Might there not be a "colonial scholar" phenomenon, in
which Black scholars, for example, exhibit a marked preference for
works written by scholars from their same group, a similar one on the
part of Chicano scholars, gay writers, and so on? At least one scholar
has suggested that this is so. Arthur Austin, writing in the Oregon
Law Review, finds in-group and self-citation rampant among the crits,
a practice he attributes to preference for ones' friends, a dislike of
patriarchy, and a "payback" mentality.4
* Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado J.D., University of
California at Berkeley, 1974. I am grateful to Jean Stefancic and Kim Quinn for invaluable
assistance in preparing this article.
1. Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Litera-
ture, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984).
2. Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing,
Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992).
3. Id. at 1372.
4. Arthur Austin, Politcal Correctness Is a Footnote, 71 OR. L. REV. 543, 555 (1992).
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To test the hypothesis about in-group citation practices among
outsider scholars, I selected three of the most characteristic works
from the CRT corpus-Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and
Rights, Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, and Derrick Bell, Foreword:
The Civil Rights Chronicles-and, in addition, seventeen articles and
books chosen from two recent bibliographies of critical race theory,
employing a table of random numbers. One of the articles so selected,
Cornel West, The Role of Law in Progressive Politics,5 turned out to
contain no citations suitable for tabulating under the criteria set out
immediately below, and was replaced by another randomly selected
article. The final list of books and articles selected turned out to in-
clude six by women, fifteen by men, six by Whites, twelve by African
Americans, two by Latinos, and one by a Native American scholar.6 I
then analyzed the footnote citation practices of this sample of twenty-
two writers.
I. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
The twenty articles contained over three thousand footnotes,
many with multiple items. I eliminated from consideration items, such
as cases and governmental reports, with no author. I also eliminated
newspaper articles and other ephemera, leaving a sample consisting
entirely of books and journal and law review articles, over nineteen
hundred in total.
I then analyzed these citations by the cited author's ethnicity-
White, Black, Latino, Asian-American, Native American or unknown.
To determine the race of the author, I used his or her last name (e.g.,
Chang or Ramirez), the AALS Directory's list of minority law profes-
sors, my own personal knowledge of and acquaintance with some of
the authors, and in a few cases, reasonable inferences from the data.
7
I also benefited from the help of a well-known Critical Race writer
who assisted me in classifying some of the authors. The results are
summarized in Table 1.
5. Cornel West, The Role of Law in Progressive Politics, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1797 (1991).
6. Two of the articles were co-authored. (See Table 1, immediately below). One author,
Erin Edmonds, was of unknown race.
7. For example, a known author, writing on a familiar subject but cited without his or her
first name.
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ARTICLE OR BOOK,
AND AUTHOR
TABLE 1
AUTHORITIES CITED
White Black Latino Asian- Native Unknown
Authors Authors Authors American American
Authors Authors
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS,
THE ALCHEMY OF RACE
AND RIGHTS (1991).
Charles R. Lawrence, III,
The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection:
Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317
(1987).
Derrick A. Bell, Foreword:
The Civil Rights
Chronicles, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1985).
Kevin Brown, The Social
Construction of a Rape
Victim: Stories of
African-American Males
About the Rape of
Desiree Washington, 1992
U. ILL. L. REV. 997
(1992).
Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
Gendered Checks and
Balances: Understanding
the Legacy of White
Patriarchy In an
American Indian Cultural
Context, 24 GA. L. REV.
1019 (1990).
Derrick A. Bell & Erin
Edmonds, Students as
Teachers, Teachers as
Learners, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 2025 (1993).
Robin D. Barnes, Realist
Review, 24 CONN. L.
REV. 553 (1992).
Richard Delgado,
Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101
YALE L.J. 1357 (1992).
Derrick A. Bell, White
Superiority in America:
Its Legal Legacy, Its
Economic Costs, 33
VILL. L. REV. 767
(1988).
33 13 3 2 1 11
178 39 11 1 0 71
50 30 0 0 0 34
2 0 0 0 0
20 11 3 4 5 28
10 17 1 1 2
1 5 0 0 0
34 34 28 3 2
3 2 0 0 0
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ARTICLE OR BOOK,
AND AUTHOR
AUTHORITIES CITED
White Black Latino Asian- Native Unknown
Authors Authors Authors American American
Authors Authors
Lani Guinier, Of
Gentlemen and Role
Models, 6 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 93 (1991).
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Bakke,
Minority Admissions, and
the Usual Price of Racial
Remedies, 67 CAL. L.
REV. 3 (1979).
Duncan Kennedy, A
Cultural Pluralist Case
For Affirmative Action in
Legal Academia, 1990
DUKE L.J. 705.
Sheri L. Johnson, Cross-
Racial Identification
Errors in Criminal Cases,
69 CORNELL L. REV. 934
(1984).
Gary Peller, Race
Consciousness, 1990
DUKE L.J. 758.
Derrick A. Bell, Strangers
in Academic Paradise:
Law Teachers of Color in
Still White Schools, 20
U.S.F. L. REV. 993
(1989).
Frances L. Ansley, Stirring
the Ashes: Race, Class
and Future of Civil
Rights Scholarship, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 993
(1989).
STEPHEN L. CARTER,
REFLECTIONS OF AN
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
BABY, (1991).
Derrick A. Bell, After
We're Gone: Prudent
Speculations On America
In a Post-Racial Epoch,
34 ST. Louis L.J. 393
(1990).
Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, Norms and
Narratives: Can Judges
Avoid Serious Moral
Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV.
1929 (1991).
1 10 5 2 0 11
6 10 3 0 0
38 62 7 6
10 0 0 0 0
78 138 5 8 2 159
2 2 0 0 0
108 121 12 8 1 29
22 39 0 3 0 16
5 2 0 0 0 2
74 17 15 9 9 18
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ARTICLE OR BOOK, AUTHORITIES CITED
AND AUTHOR
White Black Latino Asian- Native Unknown
Authors Authors Authors American American
Authors Authors
Mark Tushnet, The 92 24 2 0 0 18
Degradation of
Constitutional Discourse,
81 GEO. L.J. 251 (1992).
TOTALS 767 576 95 47 23 447
A number of patterns are immediately evident. As the reader
will see from Table 1, White authors were the most-cited group, with
767 citations. Then followed Blacks with 576 cites, Latinos with 95,
Asian-Americans with 47, and Native Americans with 23 cites. Au-
thors whose ethnicity we were unable to ascertain totaled 447.
The total for White authors cited, 767, thus exceeds the total for
all authors of color (Blacks, Latinos, Asian-Americans and Native
Americans), which was 741. The aggregate numbers thus do not bear
out the initial hypothesis that the outsider scholars cite each other
more often than they cite Whites.
Six of the outsider scholars selected randomly turned out to be
white (Kennedy, Johnson, Peller, Ansley, Stefancic, and Tushnet),
providing an opportunity to compare the citation practices of white
outsider scholars (crits and critical race theorists) to those of color. It
turned out that there was little difference-outsider scholars who
were White cited White authors 400 times, non-Whites 465 times. (See
Table 2).
TABLE 2
Author Citations to White Authors Citations to Authors of Color
Kennedy 38 76
Johnson 10 0
Peller 78 153
Ansley 108 142
Stefancic 74 50
Tushnet 92 44
Total 400 465
A final hypothesis that I was able to test was whether Black au-
thors in my sample tended to favor other scholars who were Black
over those of other ethnicities, and so on for the other groups of color.
As is shown in Table 3, this proved true, but only for Black authors.
The Black authors in my sample cited Black authors 169 times; other
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authors of color 35 times; and Whites 313 times. Latinos cited authors
of their own ethnicity 43 times; other authors of color 74 times; and
Whites 108 times. For Native Americans, I found 5 citations to other
Native American authors; 18 to other ethnic, minority authors; and 20
citations to Whites. These figures must be interpreted cautiously,
since there are many more Blacks in the world of scholarship than
there are members of these other groups, thus it should not be surpris-
ing to find Black authors citing each other more frequently than they
do members of groups whose representation in academia is very
small, such as Native Americans. On the whole, however, the figures
did not show critical race scholars relying unduly on scholars of like
color.
TABLE 3
Citations to Authors Citations to other Citations to
Authors of Same Ethnicity Authors of Color White Authors
Black 169 35 313
Latino 43 74 108
Native American 5 18 20
II. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
In addition to the numerical analysis, I also performed a qualita-
tive one. In this qualitative stage, I closely examined a sample of foot-
note references for general tone and approach. In particular, I was
curious whether the outsiders were citing mainstream scholars dismis-
sively, cavalierly, grudgingly, perfunctorily, or in a token fashion. In
my Imperial Scholar Revisited,8 I noted a variety of citation styles on
the part of mainstream scholars that had the effect, subtle or not, of
marginalizing the contributions of minorities and women. I was curi-
ous to see whether minority and critical race scholars were guilty of
something similar.
I found little evidence that this was happening. Most string cites
(ones containing a variety of authors and works) that referred to
works by both Whites and non-Whites listed them in no particular or
obvious order; in particular, White authors did not tend to be cited
first or last. I, also, was not struck by any differences in strength of
signal. The more general "cf." and "see also" signals, as well as the
stronger signals such as "see," did not seem to correlate with any par-
8. Delgado, supra note 2.
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ticular group. Vengeful or blatantly exclusionary citation of the sort
mentioned by Professor Austin simply seemed not to occur.
LIMITATIONS OF MY METHODOLOGY
I should call attention to certain limitations of my methodology.
My sample size, twenty items, is relatively small. Even though I used
a randomizing instrument to arrive at the items, it is possible that the
resulting sample is biased in some respect. The population from
which I drew also could be criticized as skewed, in that it consisted of
about three hundred law review articles and books I deemed, at an
earlier time, to be significant and also characteristic of critical race
theory. Moreover, I did not employ a control group, relying instead
on my previous two studies dealing with majority-race scholars as a
basis of comparison. It is possible that mainstream scholars' practices
have changed since I last studied them in 1992, so that the relatively
egalitarian citation patterns I found for the crits are now matched by
non-crits. Finally, the "unknown" category, which accounts for about
twenty-three percent of all cited items, may be a source of bias. It
may be that authorities who are unknown to me may be dominantly
white, or, for that matter, of color. Human error may have crept in.
Still, my admittedly limited survey begins to answer the question
with which I began. There seems not to be any dramatic "colonial
scholar" counterpart phenomenon to the imperial-scholar one I found
earlier. Outsider scholars cited scholars of majority and nonmajority
race almost evenly with a slight edge to authorities who are White.
This held true among each ethnic group in my sample-Black, White,
Latino, Asian-American, and Native American. Moreover, when out-
sider scholars did cite scholars of majority race, I found little evidence
that they were doing so caustically, dismissively, or as an afterthought.
Most of the citations were respectful and treated the white scholar or
authority in much the same way the author treated other scholars of
Critical orientation or minority hue.
A CONCLUDING COMMENT
Might it be argued that the outsiders' distribution of citations -
about one-half to white authors, the other half to non-White authors
- is nevertheless skewed, in that there are many more White than
non-White authors and that an unbiased distribution for an article on
civil rights would be, say, 70-30 or 80-20? I do not believe so. Since
the advent of critical race theory, the top reviews have seen a great
19961
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
infusion of articles by scholars of color. White scholars continue to
write about civil rights, of course, some in a critical, others in a more
mainstream vein. But the body of material waiting to be cited, in re-
cent years at least, has been composed almost equally of works by
White and non-White authors.
A second reason has to do with the theory and psychology of
citation. Commonplace propositions, ones that accord with the
reader's common sense, rarely are thought to require authority. Thus,
most law review editors allow statements like "The United States sys-
tem of civil justice is the best in the world," or "The United States has
one of the highest standards of living" to pass uncited, while they
would want to see authority for a proposition such as: "Black infant
mortality in the United States is at Third World level and worsening,"
or "Interest convergence, not idealism, accounts for the many twists
and turns of racial justice." Critical propositions, in short, are thought
to require support since they go against the grain, while more moder-
ate propositions are not. For both reasons, outsiders' citation prac-
tices as revealed in this survey strike me as about what they should be.
Crits seem to display no undue favoritism toward other crits or minor-
ity scholars. Indeed, authors writing today about equality or civil
rights whose footnotes deviated radically from the roughly equal dis-
tribution displayed by the twenty-two authors in my survey, may want
to reflect on whether they are being fair and even-handed in their
attribution and citation patterns.
[Vol. 71:969
OUTSIDER-INSIDERS: THE ACADEMY OF THE CLOSET
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.*
I
Women and people of color teach in unprecedented and increas-
ing numbers in American law schools. Fred Shapiro's survey' demon-
strates that these law teachers are publishing influential (much-cited)
articles in the leading law reviews. Throughout this Symposium, the
question is posed: Are these former outsiders now academic insiders?
If that is too tough a question, consider this one: What outsider group
is so marginalized that it is not only left out of analyses of outsider
jurisprudence, but is so far out that it has been inside all along?
Fred Shapiro's "top one hundred" lists map the arguable trans-
formation of two groups of law professor outsiders into possible new
insiders. The all-time list includes only three articles by women and
one by a person of color. Contrast their representation in the recent-
years lists: women and people of color account for 39 of the 103 most-
cited law review articles published between 1982 and 1991, and for 17
of 26 articles among the top five for the years 1987-91. This contrast
leads Shapiro to claim that "outsiders in this [recent] period have
achieved some kind of insider status in the law reviews." Lesbian,
gay, and bisexual scholars go virtually unmentioned in Shapiro's ac-
count of outsiders-turned-insiders,2 and for perfectly understandable
reasons.
An important reason is that bisexual, lesbian, or gay authors have
long been insiders, or at least outsiders who pass for insiders. By my
count, several of the 103 articles on the all-time list were written by
authors apparently having minority sexual orientations, as were twice
as many of the 103 articles on the recent-years lists. The aggregate
numbers would be surprising to most people, 3 because only one article
on the all-time list and three on the recent-years list were written by
authors who are now openly gay; none of the articles was written by
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 Chi.-Kent 751
(1996).
2. In his only mention of gay scholars, Shapiro observes that the latter figure rises to 19 of
26 if "openly gay scholars" are included. Id. at 758.
3. For reasons that will be set forth in Part III, I will not suggest exact numbers of gay
authors even if I could determine them myself.
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an author who was out in print at the time the most-cited articles were
originally published. Homosexual and bisexual scholars have long
been legal academic insiders, their minority sexual orientation-the
mark of the outsider-literally invisible.
The phenomenon of the closet that allows gay people to be insid-
ers might prevent them from being full outsiders. Hence, a woman or
a person of color is considered an outsider scholar by Shapiro and
others even if she never publishes work of feminist or race import, but
few if any pundits consider a white-gay-male author an outsider unless
he comes out as a gay man, preferably in print, or otherwise claims
outsider status. This is not surprising. What is surprising is that so few
of the lesbian, bisexual, or gay scholars have come out in print. Sexual
orientation is a key element of most people's identity in this Freudian
century, and especially so for gay people in the post-Stonewall era. It
is true that minority sexual orientations are still heavily stigmatized,
but with the exception of a few schools, legal academe is relatively
tolerant. The large majority of the most-cited articles were written by
professors with tenure. What do they fear?
There is no simple answer to this quandary, but an insight can
exploit the insider-outsider difference as applied to article subject
matter. Insider articles are those written about traditional regulatory
topics and from a point of view internal to the system's goals; these
articles explain why it is rational that the legal system has devised
such-and-such rules or how the system can better achieve its goals by
considering thus-and-so rules. Thirty years ago it would have been
unthinkable for the author of an insider article to announce his or her
sexual orientation; such a move would have discredited the article's
analysis and possibly triggered police and FBI scrutiny. This impulse
persists unabated since Stonewall, and for reasons that have to go be-
yond appropriateness. 4 An explanation must start with the paradox
that America is both anxious about and obsessed with sexuality; both
push the gay author of an insider article away from disclosure. If the
imagined reader and the author are both anxious and indeed embar-
rassed about sexuality, then reasons of privacy will suggest to the au-
thor that she purge her article of sexual orientation; this impulse can
4. It will not do to say that the author's announcement of sexual orientation might not fit
into most insider articles, for there are many inventive ways to write such articles. Even the
most technical regulatory articles use hypotheticals, and there is no reason of ontological appro-
priateness to prevent a gay author from pointing such hypotheticals in a coming-out direction.
A trust and estates article can use a hypothetical same-sex couple, and just as easily the author
and her same-sex partner. Constitutional law articles would seem even easier to write with gay-
friendly examples, including some from the author's own life.
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operate even more drastically for people with minority sexual orienta-
tions. Although usually overstated, an author's fear of offending the
reader, of appearing queer to the reader, is the most effective censor.
Also important, however, is the author's repulse at sexualizing herself,
of exposing herself to prurient outside interest. Even when the insider
author does not have to worry about losing her job or her liberty by
disclosing or hinting at her minority sexual orientation, she risks
something just as important: the loss of credibility and the diminish-
ment of influence that her ideas might have because they are over-
whelmed by the disclosure of sexual preference. 5
The totalizing feature of sexual orientation in a sex-anxious/sex-
obsessed society also provides an explanation for why gay authors
have not come out in their most-cited outsider articles. Outsider arti-
cles seek to destabilize the existing legal system, usually through cri-
tique of fundamental assumptions or presentation of excluded
viewpoints. Most of the gay-authored articles in Shapiro's recent-
years lists are outsider articles, yet the gay authors provide no hint of
minority sexual orientation in any of them. While the authors of in-
sider articles have at least a plausible subject-matter justification for
closeting their sexual orientation, the authors of recent outsider arti-
cles have no similar justification, as the dominant methodology of the
recent articles is personal narrative. 6 There would seem to be every
reason for gay authors of outsider narratives to share their sexual ori-
entation with the reader.
Yet this didn't happen in any of the most-cited articles on the
recent-years lists. One reason it didn't happen is the privacy concern.
Authors have little choice but to be out of the closet about their sex
and race; the author's name usually gives away her sex. Authors have
5. Consider this thought experiment. An author writes a brilliant economic analysis of a
trust problem; her aspiration is that this analysis will be adopted by judges, policymakers, and
other academics. If she comes out as a bisexual in the course of the article, she risks that influ-
ence (though of course she might exercise a different kind of influence). Note that she runs no
comparable risk if she comes out as a left-hander (a ho-hum confession these days), a Cubs fan
(just evidence of emotional masochism), or an astrologist (really odd but shared by many intelli-
gent people). None of these idiosyncracies has similar totalizing possibilities.
6. E.g., Mary I. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLO. L.
REV. 683 (1992). See generally Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MicH. L. REV. 2073 (1989).
Gaylegal scholarship is similarly infused with narrative methodologies. E.g., Marc A. Fajer, Can
Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protec-
tion for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMi L. REV. 511 (1992); Rhonda R. Rivera, Lawyers,
Clients, and AIDS: Some Notes from the Trenches, 49 Omio ST. L.J. 883 (1989). See generally
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1994) (responding to Daniel
A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45
STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993)).
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a great deal of choice about who knows their sexual orientation, and
the sex negativity of so many others makes the closet most comforta-
ble. A more interesting reason returns us to the totalizing features of
sexual orientation. The authors writing outsider articles who make
Shapiro's recent-years lists write articles about feminist and critical
race themes, and they write as women and as people of color. To
come out as a bisexual or lesbian or gay man, these authors would
assume the risk that their sexual orientation would overwhelm and
erase their sex or their race. Admittedly, this reason fails to appreci-
ate that the most interesting theme in the new outsider scholarship is
"intersectionality," the way in which different minoritizing character-
istics (especially race and sex) combine to produce extraordinary dis-
advantages. 7 For the period 1982-91, however, the most-cited works
on intersectionality slighted issues of sexual orientation. Why?
II
Shapiro's lists might be evidence suggesting the dominance of an
academy of the closet, in which the most successful strategy for gay
authors has been to be discreet and not to flaunt their minority sexual
orientations. However one defines "successful," this is premature. To
begin with, counting citations is just one way, and probably not the
best way, to figure academic success. Another indicium of success is
whether an author's work has changed the way lawyers look at an
issue or area of law. Richard Posner, surprisingly low on the all-time
list and virtually absent from the recent-years list, is a more significant
legal scholar than all but a few names higher up on the lists, because
his work has altered legal discourse and, indeed, created a whole new
legal discipline, law and economics. Posner should have his own list.
Consider another, less well-known exemplar.
Rhonda Rivera of the Ohio State School of Law was the first
prominent openly lesbian or gay law professor. In the 1970s and
1980s, she produced a steady stream of articles on gaylegal issues.8
Because such issues were completely marginal in legal education at
the time, the fanciest law reviews had no interest in publishing them
and aspiring tenure candidates (the grist for Shapiro's citation mill)
7. E.g., Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989
U. CI. LEGAL F. 139; Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Mother-
hood, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1993).
8. Starting with Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Ho-
mosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTIMGS L.J. 799 (1979).
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had no reason to cite or even read them. Yet for those of us who were
gay, lesbian, or bisexual law students or junior faculty during that pe-
riod, these were informative, illuminating, inspirational articles. They
showed us that gaylaw, a body of law and theory from our perspective,
was possible and could be done with the greatest professional integ-
rity.9 Rivera even had a "big theory," equal citizenship for gays, as
ambitious as, and more visionary than, the big theories that ensured
other articles multiple citations. Any all-time list that does not in-
clude Rhonda Rivera articles is a list with huge gaps.
To be sure, the Shapiro lists are dynamic; the all-time list has
been updated after ten years, and any new recent-years list will of
course be completely different from the current set. Might Rivera ap-
pear on the next all-time list? Hard to say, but it seems likely that
gaylegal articles will appear on Shapiroesque lists sometime within the
next century. My hypothesis is that gaylaw is already enjoying some
of the same efflorescence that feminism and critical race theory have
been enjoying for the last half-generation. This is already apparent in
the large number of excellent law review articles dealing with gaylegal
issues from a variety of sophisticated theoretical perspectives, the ex-
tremely active AALS section of gaylegal scholars, and the new-found
eagerness of fancy law reviews to publish gaylegal theory. Gaylaw is
now a presence in legal academe; it remains to be seen how lasting a
presence it will be.
Why is it that, after decades of scant interest, gaylaw is a boom
industry for legal academics? The obvious starting point is Bowers v.
Hardwick'0 and the intense discourse that precedent has triggered.
Just as Dred Scott v. Sanford11 was a shot in the arm for the abolition-
ists, so Bowers has been a shot in the arm for gay intellectuals as well
as activists. The decision has been condemned from every perspective
known to law professors, and scholars have used Bowers as a template
against which to articulate a whole range of constructionist and decon-
structionist theories. By sanctioning state sodomy laws in a way that
threatens to criminalize a whole class of worthy citizens, Bowers has
become the centerpiece for a whole new discourse about the legal role
9. The rights of gay people were never discussed, and the words "gay" or "lesbian" or even
"homosexual" were never uttered, in any class I took in law school (1975-78). Until I read
Rivera's articles after law school, I was not even aware that there was a body of law regulating
the lives of gay people. (I, who had been in ROTC before the volunteer army, didn't even know
that the U.S. military was supposed to interrogate and exclude me until I read Rivera!) Because
of her work, I aspired to write in a similar vein at some point in my own legal academic career.
10. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
11. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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of bisexual, lesbian, and gay citizens. The decision has opened a Pan-
dora's box of arguments and distinctions that feed into such otherwise
dissimilar issues as the legality of the military exclusion of lesbian and
gay and bisexual Americans, of state antigay initiatives, of new cen-
sorship of gay-friendly publications, of antihomosexual educational
policies, and of state suppression of information to adolescents about
safer sex. There is nothing like a big splashy, bashy Supreme Court
decision to galvanize a field of legal debate. 12
In the context of increasing recognition that gay people are actu-
ally citizens and not simple outlaws, the imperious tone of Bowers-
Justice White's insistence that only "homosexual sodomy" was at issue
and his flaunting an ignorance about even elementary features of
law's regulation of gay people-raised the stakes of gay issues, elevat-
ing them to the level of political drama, a drama just deepened by the
Supreme Court's gay-friendly decision in Romer v. Evans,13 where the
majority struck down an anti-gay initiative without any mention of
Bowers. If the opinion is read broadly, is there anything the state can-
not do to homosexuals? If homosexuals can be outlawed, are others
(Jews? Women? Poor people?) safe from popular persecution? Af-
ter Bowers, the legitimacy of the Supreme Court and of law itself has
become connected with sexual orientation, a supposition that helps
explain the Court's eagerness to balance the scales with Romer. Bow-
ers involves many of law's great themes-privacy, equal treatment,
punishment, tradition, citizenship-and bisexual, lesbian, and gay au-
thors finally have a big topic where minority sexual orientation is not
only relevant but is part of the argument: We are among you, and any
war you declare on us is a civil war.
12. Of course, there were plenty of Supreme Court decisions bashing homosexuals before
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186, most notably Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) (non-
obscene gay literature banned because viewed as "pandering"), Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118
(1967) (bisexual man kicked out of the country because of "psychopathic personality"), and
Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975) (laws severely criminalizing "crimes against nature" are not
vague). These decisions are just as badly reasoned as Bowers, and indeed are analytically antic
(they read almost like satires of Supreme Court opinions). But less was at stake in the earlier
opinions, simply because homosexuals were universally thought to be simple sickos and outlaws,
outside civilized law. These early antihomosexual opinions are like kicking Bambi, cruel in the
ignorance that they are hurting human beings who can feel and think, but insulated from criti-
cism (outside the relentless efforts of Rhonda Rivera and the ACLU) because Bambi was then
too vulnerable to fight back or make its pain understood. By the time of Bowers, it was clear to
everyone except poor Justice White and some of his colleagues that gay people could no longer
be ignored and bashed with impunity. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), is evidence that
the current Court wants to avoid the Bowers mistake.
13. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1620.
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Gaylaw would be a bright but fleeting comet if sodomy law were
its only locus of discourse, but that is far from the case. Two genera-
tions have now come of age after Stonewall. Our lives and political
activism have generated many new intersections with the law that
were scarcely thinkable before the 1970s. They are now not only
thinkable, but are writable, and gaylegal scholars have many special-
ties about which they can write:14
* antidiscrimination law, which protects against sexual orientation
discrimination in dozens of cities (including the District of Co-
lumbia) and eight states;
* family law, including adoption, surrogacy, artificial insemination,
contractual rights of couples, and same-sex marriage;
* immigration and asylum of lesbian, bisexual, and gay people
from other countries to the United States;
* hate crimes against sexual orientation minorities, as well as do-
mestic abuse by same-sex partners;
* sex education, especially about HIV infection and AIDS, and
counseling for adolescents anxious about their sexual
orientation;
* state support for gay friendly artistic projects, AIDS research,
and gay history.
Gay lives have been on the cutting edge of American society for de-
cades; families of choice, shock art, racial integration, and safer sex
are developments where gay culture moved much faster than straight
culture. The legal issues presented by gay lives are equally avant-
garde and provide a richer tapestry on which scholars can work.
Feminism and critical race theory have been pressing law's
agenda toward issues of sexuality as to which openly lesbian, gay, and
bisexual authors have much to contribute. The connection between
gaylaw and feminism is a fruitful situs for intellectual as well as practi-
cal scholarship. Particularly if gaylaw is seen as contributing to a
larger project of sexuality and the law, its agenda poses challenging
questions for core feminist issues. Because much feminist theory as-
sumes sex and gender essentialism, the social constructionism of les-
bian and gay scholarship is destabilizing to feminism.'5 The pro-sex
content of most gay scholarship challenges the regulation of sexuality
favored by some feminists. Feminist critiques reconceiving the law of
consent in sexual intercourse are confronted with unsettling examples
14. Articles on all these topics are collected in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN HUNTER,
SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND TNE LAW (forthcoming 1997).
15. If a transsexual is fired for her orientation, is that "sex" discrimination? Is the firing of
an effeminate man an example of "gender" bias? Can a male-to-female post-operative transsex-
ual marry a man? A woman? Can a person with XY chromosomes but reared as a woman
marry a man?
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of leather sex, bondage and discipline, and intergenerational sex from
lesbian, gay, and bisexual authors. 16 There are few, if any, issues of
sexuality and the law that should not be of interest to feminists, and
feminist treatments of most issues would be radically incomplete with-
out considering minority orientation perspectives, especially the dif-
ferent range of narratives and factual matter we bring to bear.
If my hypothesis is correct, that gaylaw has already entered a
growth stage, will openly bisexual, lesbian, and gay scholars become a
new set of insiders? Would the closeted homosexuals then be on the
outside? How much of this is just a shell game?
III
Kinsey numbers-Dr. Alfred Kinsey's quantification of sexual
orientation along a sliding scale of zero to six-have been a big hit in
America. Like Social Security numbers, all adults have them and they
last for life. Although heterosexuals may be dismayed to learn that
theirs is zero (a little Kinsey humor), the low number is a badge of
honor for many, and some will repress evidence that would raise their
scores. Openly gay people tend to be proud of their fives and sixes,
and some of them repress evidence that would lower their scores.
Both groups ultimately derive satisfaction from just knowing where
they are (as might bisexuals with their centrist twos and threes). This
is the common story about Kinsey numbers. I think it's wrong and
that Kinsey numbers, like most-cited lists, are plastic, strategic, and
obsessional.
Kinsey numbers have taken on a naturalness that is not entirely
rational. When Robin West recently announced, in a review of Pos-
ner's Sex and Reason, that she didn't know her Kinsey number, 17 Pos-
ner was "floored."' 8 I think she is on to something. Although most
adults, including West, have fallen into recognizable Kinsey patterns,
it seems likely that the same people could easily fall into other pat-
terns under different circumstances. 19 Kinsey's own study provided
16. Feminist criticisms of rape as violence and not sex are in tension with the S&M litera-
ture exploring ways in which violence and dominance are sexual and productive. Although
gaylegal authors shy away from defenses of sex between adults and adolescents, that topic too
will emerge from the closet and bedevil both feminism and gaylaw. See, e.g., PAT CALIFA,
PUBLIC SEX (1994).
17. Robin West, Sex, Reason, and a Taste for the Absurd, 81 GEo. L.J. 2413, 2433 (1993)
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992)).
18. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 573 (1995).
19. If Kinsey zeroes of the same sex ended up isolated from the opposite sex, a great deal of
homosexual affection, fantasies, and behavior would result. See ALLAN BtRUBt, COMING OUT
UNDER FIRE (1991) (this phenomenon occurred during World War II). These are precisely the
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evidence that the aggregate numbers of sixes and zeroes were different
for different age groups.
This understanding of sexual orientation as plastic and situational
rather than fixed and universal provides a robust reason why I refused
in the first part of this Article to identify precise numbers of most-
cited articles authored by gay people. On the one hand, it is not very
clear what one means when one says that an author is gay. That peo-
ple have dated or had intercourse with people of the same sex does
not make them gay. 20 On the other hand, that people have dated peo-
ple of different sex, married, and had children does not make them
straight. Perhaps it makes little sense to talk of straight authors ex-
cept those who have come out as straight in circumstances where it
was risky to do so. These conundrums provide deeper insight into the
phenomenon described in this Article: Much more so than female au-
thors and somewhat more so than authors of color,21 gay authors are
outsider-insiders-insiders so long as they remain in the closet, and
outsiders when it suits them, as when gaylegal issues become promi-
nent enough to make it attractive for more authors to come out of the
closet.
If one views sexual orientation primarily by what people declare,
one must recognize the strategic features of sexual orientation. The
closet is a fluid residence. During the McCarthy era, virtually every-
one publicly presented themselves as Kinsey zeroes. Stonewall was an
event that stimulated large numbers of queers to come out of the
closet, but people presented themselves as Kinsey fives and sixes in
part because they had seen others doing so and expected yet others to
follow, and in part because they expected official persecution of ho-
mosexual activity to relent once large numbers of people came out.
Although coming out surely had a connection to sexual feelings, it was
also important as a social and political statement.
Others, from whom Kinsey inquisitors could surely extract con-
fessions of homosexual fantasies and acts, have not come out. There
is no reason to believe that they are any more or less attracted to
criteria for a Kinsey six. Conversely, the many rewards in our society for ostensible heterosexu-
ality surely bend many people to lower Kinsey numbers.
20. Is it fair to say that everybody who has had intercourse with someone of the same sex is
homosexual in orientation? Surely not. Everbody who has had same-sex fantasies? No. Fanta-
sies plus sex? Not even that. One reason the military's exclusion of bisexuals, gay men, and
lesbians is so irrational is that the military is chasing after a plastic characteristic.
21. For an excellent exploration of parallel identity politics for gays and people of color, see
Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual Orienta-
tion, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263 (1995). Karst shows how race and sexual orientation binarism are
decaying in ways that sex binarism is not.
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people of the same sex than out lesbians and gay men, because their
decision not to come out is just as strategic. They don't want to sacri-
fice their other identity characteristics that would be at risk if they
were openly gay.22 Many see their professional careers or influence at
risk if they came out. This helps explain why so few of the authors of
either traditional or critical scholarship are willing to present them-
selves as gay. Even though most don't fear losing their jobs, they fear
distraction from their ideas or from the identity stance they have as-
sumed in their articles (economic man, woman of color). Now that
gaylegal scholarship has attracted a critical mass of authors, issues of
sexuality fill the courtrooms and legislatures, and the fancy law re-
views are willing to publish on these and related topics, one would
expect more people to come out as openly gay, bisexual, or lesbian
scholars. One would expect this phenomenon to be affected by such
charged variables as race and sex.
It is hard to characterize gay or bisexual-white-male scholars as
either insiders or outsiders, for the accessibility of the closet allows
potential outsiders to write as insiders and then to come out when it is
safe or when the academic agenda offers genuine opportunities. Les-
bians or bisexual women and gays of color do not have the same op-
tion that gay-white men have, for they will be some species of outsider
even if their sexual orientation is secret. They too ought to come out
in greater numbers when it is safe or opportune to do so, but one
would expect relatively less coming out because some women and
people of color will rationally fear their sexual orientation will erase
their sex, gender, and race claims. I would, however, expect some les-
bians and people of color to come out in the process of exploring in-
tersectionality issues posed by sexual orientation, race, and sex.
Sexual orientation in our society is, finally, an obsessional dis-
course. Gay people did not create the idea of sexual orientation; it
was thrust upon us by a striving bourgeois culture and generations of
madcap medics. They created our identity and then put us in jails,
hospitals, and asylums for it. Coming out has been our effort as a
group to resist this depravity; in Foucauldian terms, we have re-
claimed our subjectivity as human agents by defying the stigmatizing
power of sexual orientation. But most of us (and almost all of us in
the legal academy) have hedged our bets, coming out as vanilla-fla-
22. Hence the common phenomenon of being only partly out of the closet. One can be out
at work, but not to one's parents. One can be out to one's friends, but not to one's coworkers.
The decision of whom to come out to is in part a strategic decision, of how one wants others to
perceive her.
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vored homosexuals, virtually normal!23 We have not come out as
transsexuals, leather dykes, masochists, drag queens, or pedophiles-
all orientations shocking to middle class and even radical feminist so-
ciety and even more totalizing in the creation of a singular identity.
One would expect that if openly gay scholarship comes to be accepted
in the legal academy, a process already under way, little waves of new
outsiders will form. Every assimilation generates new lines being
drawn and new outsiders being created.
The obsessional feature of sexual orientation has some similarity
to the obsessional feature of most-cited law review article lists.
Counting up citations contributes something to human knowledge, but
it is also significant as a discourse of inclusion-exclusion. Who got on
the list? works alongside, Who got left out? Are there people with
AIDS on the lists?
23. Apologies to ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL (1995).
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